The history of competitive water sports in southern Africa
Preventing ‘A Wonderful Break-Through for Rhodesia’ |
| OLYMPIKA: The International Journal of Olympic Studies VOLUME XIV – 2005 PAGES 47 - 68 |
The exclusion of the Rhodesia team from the 1968 Olympics was one part of a long-running international campaign against the white minority government of Ian Smith. Between 1965 and 1979, Rhodesia existed as an international pariah state, with Britain, the Commonwealth, most African states, and the United Nations amongst those ranged against it. Indeed, Rhodesian Olympic officials alleged that the events of August 1968 were the result of “United Nations interference in the running of the International Olympic Committee.” Records held in the Britain’s Public Record Office reveal, however, that it was actually the government of the United Kingdom, Rhodesia’s former Colonial ruler, that had been the primary instigator of the exclusion. These files reveal not only the involvement of the British, but that the exclusion of Rhodesia from the Games had in fact been a major policy objective for the British government and had occupied its attention for over a year. This paper utilizes those records to analyze the campaign against Rhodesian participation at the 1968 Games. The exclusion of Rhodesia from the 1968 Games was a much more significant development than has been previously recognized. Although usually viewed as being a mere appendix to the international campaign against Apartheid sport in South Africa, the Rhodesian issue is revealed to have been an entirely separate issue. Unlike its neighbour, Rhodesia’s exclusion was in direct response to the nature of its ruling regime rather than racial issues within domestic sport. Rather than being the outcome of a multilateral international campaign, Rhodesia’s eventual exclusion from the Mexico Olympics was almost totally the outcome of a concerted diplomatic campaign by one state, the United Kingdom. The lengths to which the British government went to secure this outcome, to the extent of promulgating an African boycott of the Games, are revealed for the first time. Historiography A pro-Rhodesian perspective of the issues surrounding the 1968 Olympics can be found in Donald Cheffers’ A Wilderness of Spite: Rhodesia Denied. Sports historians, however, appear to have almost totally overlooked the significance of the issue. Perhaps surprisingly, the issue is only sparsely addressed in the literature relating to the campaign against South African participation in international sport. Booth’s The Race Game, Archer and Bouillon’s The South African Game, and Darby’s Africa, Football and FIFA make no reference to the campaign against Rhodesia. Neither do country-specific works like Templeton’s and Richards’ works concerning New Zealand. Lapchick’s The Politics of Race and International Sport highlights some specific examples of actions against Rhodesia, but contains no analysis of the wider campaign. Ramsamy is one of the few authors to give consideration to the issue within the wider context of the anti-Apartheid movement in sport, although this was only as part of a relatively short article. The Rhodesian issue has been even more neglected in studies of modern British sport. Holt and Mason’s Sport in Britain 1945-2000 mentions the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia in terms of the broader racial context surrounding the D’Oliveira Affair, but makes no mention of the debate surrounding continuing Rhodesian participation in international sport. Neither do Polley’s Moving the Goalposts or Hill’s Sport, Leisure & Culture in Twentieth Century Britain. Even Coughlan and Webb’s study of Sport and British Politics since 1960 devotes less than one sentence to the issue, and only in passing. The issue is highlighted briefly in Beacom’s article on sport and international relations, but only in the context as a topic worthy of future analysis rather than as a substantial part of the work itself. There are two significant reasons why the boycott against Rhodesia deserves greater attention. Firstly, and a key focus of this paper, was the attitude of the British government, which is generally regarded as having taken a fairly hands-off approach to issues surrounding racial issues and sport in Southern Africa. On occasions it criticized (but always stood short of preventing) incoming tours by South African teams, but it never opposed South Africa’s participation in international events (and in the eyes of many was seen to be supportive of South Africa). In the case of Rhodesia, however, not only was Britain involved in unilateral action against Rhodesian participation, but it even agitated secretly to ferment the threat of an international boycott against the Games unless Rhodesia was excluded. The second important factor surrounding the boycott, and its fundamental difference from the campaign against Apartheid sport in 1960s South Africa, was the essential reason for the boycott. Unlike the case of the latter at this time, the campaign against Rhodesian participation in international sport focused solely on the nature of the Rhodesian government, and not on racial issues in Rhodesian sport. The focus was thus purely in the realm of international relations and Colonial affairs, aimed at the isolation of a racially-discriminatory regime, rather than in the domestic politics of Rhodesian sport. In fact, the campaign against Rhodesia foreshadowed the shift in focus of the South African campaign in the mid to late 1970s. Rhodesia, Britain, and UDI Granting this concession to a white minority government was unacceptable to the British in the international political climate of the 1960s, and they sought to negotiate a solution. The British did not insist the immediate transition to majority rule, but instead sought a solution that would commit the country to eventual majority African rule (albeit after a relatively long and unspecified transition period). Even this, however, was unacceptable to the white population and, fearful of losing their privileged position, the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith declared its independence from Britain on the 11th of November 1965, an action universally referred to as the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). The British government, led by Prime Minister Harold Wilson, declared UDI an illegal act of rebellion and claimed that Britain retained legal authority over Rhodesia. The British Parliament backed this up with a vigorous campaign to deny any international recognition to the Smith regime, but stood short of taking any direct action to replace the Rhodesian government. These actions, and particularly the failure to take military action, were heavily criticised by the newly-independent African members of the Commonwealth, and the ensuing crisis threatened to undermine the future of the Commonwealth itself. British Efforts to Isolate Rhodesia These efforts to deny international legitimacy to the Smith regime widened quickly into the realm of sporting politics. Although Britain took the lead in these efforts, it often gained support from other countries opposed to the Rhodesian regime, particularly amongst the Commonwealth nations from Africa. An early potential flashpoint came at the 1966 Empire and Commonwealth Games in Kingston, Jamaica. Invitations to compete in these Games had been issued prior to the declaration of UDI, and Rhodesia still hoped to compete despite its shift in political status. This participation was opposed by a number of African nations, who threatened to boycott the Games in protest. At this point the Rhodesians withdrew, ostensibly in order to save embarrassment to Prince Philip, who was to open the Games. Given that UDI was essentially an act of rebellion against the British Crown, the Rhodesians had been left with little choice in this matter. From then on, however, the Rhodesians fought much harder to maintain a presence in the international sporting arena. The British were equally resolute in opposing these efforts, arguing that sporting contacts offered “comfort to the illegal regime in Rhodesia.” The British counter attack succeeded, amongst others, in dissuading the Field Hockey Association from inviting a Rhodesian team to England in 1966, persuading the Spanish government to refuse visas for a Rhodesian hockey team to compete in an international tournament in Madrid in April 1967, and led to the Irish, Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish teams withdrawing from the World Ploughing Championships in Rhodesia the following year. Not all efforts were successful; the French rugby team played against Rhodesia in Salisbury in July 1967, and the Mauritian soccer team also visited later that year. Rhodesia also succeeded in gaining admission to the Davis Cup tennis competition in 1968, although its away-tie against Sweden was abandoned after anti-racism protestors invaded the match venue. The British government also took steps to prevent British club teams and individual athletes from visiting Rhodesia. Its greatest success came in dissuading the Yorkshire County Cricket Club, the reigning English champions, from touring in September 1967. Yorkshire had been invited to tour by the Rhodesian Cricket Association, and had accepted in principle if expenses were guaranteed. When the Commonwealth Office found out about the proposed tour, it successfully lobbied the County to decline the invitation. Prospective tours by the Worcestershire County Cricket Club and an invitational soccer team led by Welsh star John Charles were also cancelled (the latter after the Zambian government threatened to cancel the team’s matches in Zambia if the Rhodesia fixtures were fulfilled). This strategy did not find universal favour within Britain, particularly from the conservative press. The Daily Telegraph launched a stinging editorial which claimed that:
For a Commonwealth Office spokesman to suggest now that, in playing cricket with a Rhodesian team, Yorkshire would be offering ‘aid and comfort to an illegal regime’ is ludicrous. … The next step in this decision will be postal censorship of Christmas cards in case Mr Smith is getting some goodwill message across. Fascist Italy and Germany used to align their athletics closely to their foreign policies, and Britain is in danger of making the same pernicious mistake.”
The 1968 Olympics The issue of Rhodesian involvement in the 1968 Games occupied the minds of British officials from at least July 1967, when reports appearing in the Rhodesian press indicated the intention to send a team to Mexico. Although there was some feeling from within the Foreign Office that Britain would not be able to influence any IOC decision on the matter, a consensus emerged that some effort must be made to prevent Rhodesian participation. Any immediate action was delayed, however, by difficulties in ascertaining Rhodesia’s official status in the IOC. The British were also concerned that Rhodesia may have been invited to participate in the Winter Olympics. As early as July 1967, there were reports that Rhodesia would receive an invitation to the Games in Grenoble, France. This caused a minor flurry of activity within the Commonwealth Office, as efforts were made to ascertain the truth of these reports. Enquiries were made to the Quai d’Orsay (the French Foreign Ministry), which struggled to ascertain the status of Rhodesia’s involvement in the event. The Rhodesians eventually did receive an invitation, but declined to send a team on the grounds that “no winter sports are held in Rhodesia.” This invitation stoked British fears that Rhodesia would receive an invitation to the Summer games in Mexico City - an invitation that was not likely to be turned down. These fears were finally realised on the 14th of November 1967 when the office of Arq. Ramirez Vazquez, the President of the Mexican Organising Committee, told the British Embassy in Mexico City that an invitation had been issued to the Rhodesians. One week later the invitation was presented formally to the Rhodesian National Olympic Committee in Salisbury. Upon this announcement, a British effort to reverse the decision to invite Rhodesia swung into action. The Commonwealth Office informed its representatives in Salisbury that “maximum effort must be made to have the invitation cancelled.” Utmost amongst the British concerns was that Rhodesia would exploit its participation at the Games in an attempt to claim legitimacy for the Smith regime. British diplomats warned that “the appearance of a Rhodesian team at the Games would be a feather in the regime’s cap, and would be fully exploited in its propaganda.” The presence of a Rhodesian team in Mexico City would be cited as evidence of “Rhodesia’s international acceptability as an independent state” and that participation would “be a big boost for Rhodesian morale, and is bound to be regarded in Salisbury as conveying a kind of international recognition, while a withdrawal of the invitation to her would of course be very much the reverse.” The British Minister of State added that participation in the Games would allow “Mr Smith [to] feel he had again succeeded in smacking us in the face.” The British were particularly concerned that Rhodesia may have declared itself a Republic by the time that the Games had begun, and that the Games thus might become even more of a showcase of the regime’s political ambitions. Allied to this were concerns that Rhodesia would have also adopted a new flag and national anthem, which would have been in evidence at the Games. Here again, there was concern that the result would provide added legitimacy to the regime’s claims of independence and its desire for international recognition. The Rhodesian Perspective Perhaps more pointedly, Ian Smith claimed that the invitation to the Games was a political victory for Rhodesia, and took steps to associate himself publicly with the team. This included becoming the foundation member of the Rhodesian Olympic Supporters Association, which had been established as part of a fund-raising campaign by the NOCR. Addressing Douglas Downing, President of the National Olympic Committee, at the public launch of the fund, Smith proclaimed “what a tremendous achievement this has been, what a wonderful breakthrough for Rhodesia, not only in the sporting world but in general as far as Rhodesian acceptance throughout the world is concerned. I think all Rhodesians owe you a tremendous vote of thanks for what you have done.” Smith himself made the official public announcement of the athletes who had been selected to the Rhodesian Olympic team. He concluded his announcement with a blatantly political statement offering his congratulations to: all those people who have been responsible for organising this effort and for initiating the spirit which is so typical of Rhodesia today, that spirit which has kept them going in spite of all the impediments which have been thrown in their way. In spite of all the odds which were against them. In spite of all the yelling jackals by the way they have nevertheless gone on, dedicating themselves to the cause. On the one hand, such statements certainly seem to justify the fears voiced by British diplomats. On the other hand, there is no evidence to suggest that Rhodesia sought to compete in the Games for political purposes only. The impetus for the participation came from within Rhodesian sport, and it was only after the team was invited to the Games that the government sought to attach itself to it. Moreover, if the primary motivation for participation was to gain international publicity for the regime, then it is unlikely that the Rhodesians would have declined the invitation to attend the Winter Olympics and may instead have sought to ‘manufacture’ a team (however small or uncompetitive) in order to claim a propaganda victory through their mere participation. Smith’s comments may also have been counter-productive, both in adding strength to the British government’s resolve and in supplying the British with evidence that the Rhodesian presence would be exploited by the Smith regime for political purposes. Efforts to Prevent Rhodesian Participation For its part, the IOC held that since Rhodesia had a history of Olympic participation that pre-dated UDI, there should be no barriers to its participation at the 1968 Games. As was the case with many other British colonies, the pre-independence Rhodesian ‘National’ Olympic Committee was recognised by the IOC and the colony had participated in previous Games. In fact, as early as 1928, the International Olympic Committee had authorised Rhodesia (along with the fellow British colony of Malta) to compete as an ‘independent’ nation, and two Rhodesian boxers competed in the Amsterdam Games in that year. Rhodesia subsequently dropped out of the Olympic arena, although it is possible that some Rhodesians competed as part of South African teams (as happened regularly in cricket and rugby union). Rhodesia had successfully reapplied for recognition in 1959 and sent teams to both the 1960 and 1964 Games. The IOC argued that changes in the nature of Rhodesia’s government should not restrict its ability to continue this participation. Essentially, the IOC relied on the same arguments it used to justify South Africa’s invitation to the 1968 Games. South Africa had been excluded from the 1964 Games in Tokyo, but the IOC invited the country to send a team to Mexico City. This caused an international outcry, as South African sport remained deeply segregated and the compromises agreed to by the South Africans were viewed as mere window dressing. A concerted protest effort, backed by the threat of a boycott, forced the IOC to rescind this decision and to withdraw the invitation to the South Africans.35 Britain hoped that the IOC would also reconsider its invitation to Rhodesia, and even used its influence to have the issue raised at a meeting of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa prior to the IOC decision. The arguments that had been successfully used to finally exclude the Springboks could not, however, be applied against Rhodesia, as sport in the latter was not segregated along South African lines. Although there were aspects of racism within Rhodesian sport, most specifically a ban on mixed sport within many state schools, these were not symptomatic of the situation in the country as a whole. Most Rhodesian sport was integrated, including soccer and athletics. The Rhodesian teams at the 1960 and 1964 Olympics had been multi-racial in composition and there were no indications that the Rhodesians ever planned to send a racially segregated team to Mexico City (and indeed, the team that was selected to travel was multi-racial in composition). Passports and the ‘Stop List’ Although denying the legitimacy of Rhodesian passports may have struck a symbolic blow against international recognition of the legitimacy of the Salisbury government, in reality it did little to actually prevent Rhodesians traveling internationally. The resolution applied only to Rhodesian passports, whereas the vast majority of white Rhodesians had some form of dual citizenship, usually either British or South African, and were able to travel freely under the passport of these other nations. It is likely that a similar situation would exist for the bulk of the athletes selected for the Mexico City Games. In fact, British officials suggested that possibly the only athletes unable to circumvent the ban on Rhodesian passports would have been the two black Rhodesian members of the team, Mathias Kanda and Bernard Dzoma, which had the potential to draw ridicule on any efforts to enforce this ban. Moreover, due to the fact at least three Rhodesian team members would travel on British passports, the British government could no longer rely on indirect pressure on either the IOC or other nations to achieve the exclusion of Rhodesia from the games. The British did have one measure at their disposal to close this loophole. In January 1966, the Government had introduced an order permitting it to withdraw the British passports of individuals associated with the Rhodesia rebellion. Implementation of this action, which became commonly referred to as ‘stop listing’, would prevent selected Rhodesians from international travel, including the denial of entry to the United Kingdom. Amongst those targeted by this measure were sanctions-breakers, members of the Southern Rhodesian government, and Rhodesia Front members. British officials discussed the option of adding the members of the Rhodesian Olympic team to the ‘stop list,’ to prevent them from traveling to Mexico. The Wilson government was unwilling to pursue this option for a range of issues, both procedural and political. The entire operation of the stop list was a sensitive matter within Britain, and the government was weary of utilising it in all but the most serious cases. Even amongst those opposed to the Smith regime, there was a widespread belief that withdrawing the passport of a British citizen and denying them entry to Britain was a repressive step that could only be justified, if at all, in the most extreme situations. Given the general public’s attitudes surrounding the association of politics and sport, which generally ranged from apathy to opposition to the mixing of the two, it is likely that such a step would meet with widespread disapproval. Indeed, later correspondence with the multi-party Committee of MPs (over which the government and civil service did not have direct control) responsible for overseeing the stop-list revealed that any attempts to add the team to the stop-list would have been unsuccessful. The Committee reported that It appears that Mr. Ian Smith has sought to treat the team as being in a sense Ambassadors for the regime, but we consider that it would be wrong to attribute to individual members of the team any willingness to act in that capacity in the absence of any evidence that they accept it. In our view, if men agree to represent their country in a sporting event, it would be wrong to infer from that alone that they have given, or are likely to give, support or encouragement to the people purporting to be the government of that country merely because these people misconstrue and misrepresent the activities of the sportsmen. Anticipating such problems, the government discounted using the stop-list as an option, with Prime Minister Wilson himself making the final decision. Instead, the government decided to adopt a strategy of applying pressure on the Mexican hosts to force them to take the decisive step to exclude the Rhodesians. It is one of the ironies of the situation that British government efforts in 1968 were directed not against the Rhodesians, but focused instead on applying pressure against the Mexican government. Pressuring the Mexicans Relatively quickly, however, the British realized that the Mexicans were in a difficult position, and that their evasiveness was caused by the magnitude of the problems that they faced. Staging the 1968 Games was a major political project for the Mexican Government, and the Olympics were intended to both stimulate and publicize the development of the nation. Joseph Arbena notes that “the objective was to show Mexico at its best, both to enhance image and pride as an end in itself, but clearly also to open channels for more trade, investment and tourism.” Naturally, any events that might threaten the success of the Games were bad news for the Mexican organizers. However much the Mexicans might have preferred that the Rhodesians be excluded from the Games, they were in no position to act independently or arbitrarily from the IOC. Admission to the Olympic Games was a matter for the IOC rather than the Organising Committee, and, as was previously noted, the IOC had indicated that it would not review its position on Rhodesia. Moreover, the IOC flexed its muscles over this issue at a meeting with International Sports Federations at Lausanne in April 1965 and mandated that any country hosting the Games must guarantee that no visa restrictions be placed on athletes from any country.50 Avery Brundage and other IOC members sent out strong warnings to the Mexicans that any attempt to exclude the Rhodesians was a breach of their host agreement, and would likely result in the Games being stripped from them. Although the British government came to have some sympathy with the difficult position that the Mexican organisers found themselves in, this did not mean that it did not seek to exploit these difficulties to further British aims. The British lost no opportunity in reminding the Mexicans of the possibility of an ‘Afro-Asian’ boycott of the Games over Rhodesia. More significantly, the British did not just place bilateral pressure, but instead actively campaigned to bring multi-lateral pressure against the Mexicans. In particular, the British sought to involve the nations of the Commonwealth, and particularly the newly-independent members from Africa and the Caribbean, in pressuring the Mexicans. The idea of soliciting Commonwealth nations in the campaign against Rhodesian participation had been under discussion long before the rejection of the ‘stop list’ option. As early as December 1967, the Secretary of State was urging that “maximum effort should be made to have the invitation cancelled” and “that we should mobilise the Commonwealth countries to lobby the IOC about this; and possibly ask them to mobilise other Afro-Asian countries.” Once it became clear that the IOC would not be swayed, the British aimed to pressure the Mexicans through the Commonwealth nations. This Commonwealth focus, approved by Prime Minister Wilson himself, called for “a vigorous effort … to encourage African countries to bring pressure to bear on Mexico for the exclusion of the Rhodesian team on the same ground as the South Africans.” In particular, the British raised the spectre of a boycott as a means to force the Mexicans to act against the Rhodesians. There was considerable internal debate about the merits of this proposal, with apprehension that the strategy might backfire, particularly if the African nations were to ‘side with the Mexicans’ and insist that Britain withdraw the passports of any Rhodesian competitor. Nonetheless, the scheme was finally put into effect in early August, with dispatches being sent to British High Commissions in Africa directing them to approach their host government to encourage it to put pressure on the Mexicans. Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia were targeted specifically, while approaches were also made to other African nations deemed likely to be sympathetic to the British cause, particularly Ethiopia. All targeted governments were asked to exert diplomatic pressure on the Mexicans, both directly and through forums like the United Nations, as well as to convince their National Olympic Committees that a threatened boycott action would have positive outcomes. These efforts bore some fruit, with both the Kenyan Government and National Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association publicly calling for Rhodesia’s exclusion from the Games. Although there was an encouraging response from the Ethiopian government, it found little support in Zambia. The British were wary, however, of being seen to be behind any action by African nations, warning its diplomats that they should “do all you can to ensure that in any demarches made as a result of your approaches, the Africans appear to be acting under their own steam and not at our suggestion.” Commonwealth opposition to Rhodesia’s participation in the Games was not, however, solely the result of British pressure. As has been noted, Rhodesia’s UDI had caused a major controversy within the Commonwealth and there was fierce opposition to the Smith regime, particularly from amongst the African members. In April 1968, before the British launched its diplomatic offensive against the Mexicans, Jamaican, and Ghanaian diplomats proposed threatening the Mexicans with a boycott over the issue (prompting one British diplomat to note with satisfaction that “no harm will be done if the Jamaicans stir up the hornets’ nest a little”). Later, in June, a number of African representatives to the United Nations, including those of Tanzania and Guinea, voiced opposition to Rhodesian involvement in the Games, although no steps appear to have been taken to insist upon Rhodesian exclusion. Opposition to Rhodesian participation in the Games also emerged from other quarters. In November 1967, Harry Edwards demanded that South Africa and Rhodesia be excluded from the Games as one of six conditions necessary to prevent a boycott by African-American athletes. As well, Rhodesia continued to be mentioned in later publications of the Olympic Project for Human Rights. The place of Rhodesia within the African-American protest movement has been overlooked in all historical analyses of the ‘revolt of the Black athlete,’ but is worthy of greater attention, particularly with regard to the wider links that Edwards was attempting to forge with Black Africa. Edwards’ proclamation was noteworthy for being one of the few occasions on which the Rhodesian issue came into the public spotlight. Throughout its own campaign, the British government was at pains to keep the issue of Rhodesian participation in the Games, and its own efforts to prevent it, out of the limelight. This was prompted partly by domestic considerations, mindful of both public support for the white Rhodesian cause and fearful of accusations of bringing politics unnecessarily into sport, as had happened when it lobbied Yorkshire CCC from touring Rhodesia in 1967. The sentiment that sport and politics should not mix still held much popular sway. Indeed, when discussing the question of South African participation in the Games, the opposition Conservative Party had argued that “the less political interference in sport the better,” and somewhat patronisingly added “if an example is not given in this respect by the more responsible nations, such as ours, the whole future of the Olympic Games will be at stake.” For the Wilson Government to be seen not only supporting, but actually instigating, a boycott would have triggered severe domestic criticism. The main reason for British discretion, however, stemmed from a concern that the failure of a high-profile campaign against Rhodesian participation would hand an even-bigger propaganda victory to the Smith regime. Participating in the Games would be one thing, but doing so in the face of strong British government opposition would be far more significant, leading one Commonwealth Office official to warn “we must too be careful not to engage our prestige too heavily and too obviously against Rhodesian participation: the Olympics is not a good ground to pick for a public trial of strength with the regime.” Another official noted, “that [if] Rhodesia should be seen to win it after all our influence has been thrown into a lobbying exercise with governments it would seem to represent a much greater victory politically for Rhodesia than if we were to take a relaxed line from the start.” The discretion with which the matter was pursed by the British may also help to explain why the Rhodesia issue has been overlooked by historians. Whereas the campaign against South African participation in sport was characterised by high-profile public campaigns and the glare of publicity, the British government succeeded in keeping its diplomatic drive against the Rhodesians out of the spotlight of publicity. Beyond official files, there is little evidence to suggest that anything took place at all. In fact, so successful was this veil of secrecy, that the final notice of Rhodesia’s withdrawal from the Games drew far less coverage than the circumstances of a single Rhodesian cricketer who had been refused entry to Britain two weeks previously. Colin Bland, who was also a South African test representative, had attempted to enter Britain to take part in a low-profile invitational match, but was denied entry due to the fact he was travelling on a Rhodesian passport. This incident made the front page of many papers and even drew editorial comment, which ranged from condemnation of the move by the Daily Express as “petty-minded and stupid,” to support from the then left-wing Sun.64 By contrast, Rhodesia’s Olympic withdrawal, although mentioned in most newspapers, garnered far fewer column inches, no editorial comment, and not even a single hint of the role played by the British government. It ought to be noted that at no time was it ever suggested, or even discussed, that the British team itself should boycott the Games, or even threaten to boycott them, over the Rhodesia issue. To have done so would have been politically untenable for the Wilson Government and would have guaranteed a swath of domestic criticism. As such, the British government was guilty of hypocrisy, especially as it was exposing overseas athletes to the threat of missing the Games through a boycott when it was not prepared to place British athletes in the same position. The lack of consideration of this later option reflects the fact that the British government simply had no power or authority to take such a decision anyway, as the British Olympic Association was independent of the government (as would be demonstrated twelve years later when the British Olympic Association rejected Margaret Thatcher’s call to boycott the 1980 Moscow Games). The British government’s inability to exert any control over British sporting organizations proved to be a cause of embarrassment in its efforts to gain international support for Rhodesia’s exclusion from the Games. Despite its efforts to persuade other nations to isolate Rhodesia from international sport, it was unable itself to prevent British sporting bodies from maintaining contacts with Rhodesia. Although the government had been able to persuade some organizations from visiting the Republic, most notably, the Yorkshire County Cricket Club, a number of tours did go ahead. The Oldham Athletic Football Club played seven matches in June 1967 and the Scottish squash team toured in August 1968. The most damaging of these contacts was the visit of the British Lions rugby union team to Rhodesia in June 1968. Not only did the match take place at the exact time when the British government was lobbying Mexico to take action, but the status of a tour by a national team (albeit one actually representing the four national rugby unions spread across both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland) gave the impression, at least to the outside world, of official sanction. Endgame The Mexicans’ ability to act unilaterally against the Rhodesians was further compromised by the IOC’s requirement that host nations admit entry to any person holding an official Olympic identity document, which could be used in lieu of a passport to gain entry to the host nation. In essence, the entire Rhodesian team would be able to subvert the UN passport ban and enter Mexico. Despite a flurry of correspondence between the Mexicans and British discussing potential means of circumventing this fact, it became clear that this would leave the Mexicans powerless to refuse entry to the Rhodesians. Given this, did the statement of the 6th of June reveal a real desire to take action against the Rhodesians, or was it merely a case of saying the ‘right thing’ to placate the British, and to relieve the pressure of a potential boycott? On analysis, it would appear to be part of a genuine effort to exclude the Rhodesians. For instance, the Mexicans circulated information that while Mexico was obliged to honour the Olympic identity cards, no other country was bound by these obligations. Given that there were no direct flights between Rhodesia and Mexico, the Rhodesian team would be required to transfer through another country which, the Mexicans pointed out, could refuse entry to Rhodesian passport holders. Moreover, throughout the later part of 1968, the Mexicans, fearful of a rebuke from the IOC if they overstepped the bounds of the UN resolution 253, implored the British to take concrete steps that would strengthen the Mexican hand to act against the Rhodesians. Even before Resolution 253 was passed, Mexico asked the British to add a clause specifically directed against Rhodesian participation in international sporting events. The Mexican government requested also that Britain reconsider adding the British passport-holders amongst the Rhodesian team to the ‘stop list.’ At the very least, the Mexicans hoped that the British would issue a public statement of support backing Mexican statements against Rhodesian involvement. It is here that the situation attained an almost surreal quality, for on all these counts the British refused to take action. Despite their desire to see the Rhodesians excluded, the British remained unwilling to be publicly associated with the end result. Thus, for instance, the request to single out sporting visits was rejected on the grounds that it “would be liable to cause political difficulty here,” while even the call for a statement of support was rebuffed; and while refusing to take any steps to aid the Mexicans, the British continued to increase pressure on Mexico to act against the Rhodesians. Despite the lack of any practical support from Britain, but in the face of mounting concerns about the likelihood of a boycott, the Mexicans took a decisive step against Rhodesian participation. The Mexicans simply failed to dispatch the Olympic identity documents to Rhodesia, claiming that the Rhodesian entry had been misplaced or lost. This excuse was widely recognized as laughable, but the action had the desired effect. Without these documents, the Rhodesians (or at least those who only had a Rhodesian passport) would be unable to travel to Mexico for the Olympics. The Mexicans actually hinted to the British that such an course of action was possible as early as April 1968 when Licenciado Gallastegui, of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, revealed to a British diplomat that he had “one or two ideas as to how the Rhodesians might be prevented from participating, if necessary by last-minute administrative measures.” Finally, on the 31st of August, the NOCR admitted defeat and acknowledged that it would be unable to send its team to Mexico City. To some degree, the Rhodesians had bought the Mexican bluff, for they could still have attempted to send a skeleton squad of athletes holding foreign passports to Mexico. This was something of which both the Mexicans and British remained fearful. Although the Mexicans may have been prepared to take the politically-risky step of denying entry to such a team, there was still a strong possibility that individual Rhodesian competitors traveling on British or other passports could ‘slip through the net’ of Mexican immigration due to the vast numbers of travelers arriving during the Games period. Rhodesia’s Exclusion Reassessed This ‘attitude’ is best displayed in the British government’s conflicting stance with regards to South African participation in sport. Britain maintained a comprehensive sporting relationship with the Republic and, despite some public protest, there was little hint of government opposition to this. The Commonwealth Office had kept a watching brief over the controversy surrounding South Africa’s participation at Mexico City, but this appears to have been done mainly to help seek useful information for the British campaign against Rhodesia. Indeed, memos warned that care should be taken not to disclose too much concerning Britain’s sentiment over South African participation, and especially any claim that sport and politics should not mix, should the disclosures be used to argue against any similar sanctions toward Rhodesia. The paradox in the British position over sporting relations with Rhodesia and South Africa was best displayed by events surrounding the 1968 British Lions rugby union tour to South Africa. As has already been noted, the inclusion of a match in Rhodesia on this tour was a major source of concern for the British, and resulted in considerable activity by the Commonwealth Office to try and prevent this one match from taking place. The South African tour itself raised no cause for concern for the British government. This resulted in an almost farcical situation resulting from a government decision to boycott a pre-tour function at the South African High Commission, in protest at the match against Rhodesia. Desperate to mollify the South Africans, a fevered effort was made to “assure them that no offence was meant to them” over this action. In some ways, the more appropriate Olympic parallel to the Rhodesian issue was not the boycott of South Africa, but rather the contests for national legitimacy and recognition that fuelled the debates over German and Chinese representation within the Olympic movement. Rhodesian participation at Mexico City would have potentially provided the same international legitimacy for the Smith government and UDI. The sports boycott against Rhodesia, however, may help to shed new insights on the campaign against South African participation in international sport. Booth notes that the initial focus on the campaign against South Africa was racism within South African sport, as demonstrated by the controversy surrounding South African participation at the 1968 Olympics. Only in the 1970s, and particularly through the increasing role of the South African Council On Sport (SACOS), did the focus turn exclusively toward excluding South Africa because of the racial segregation at the heart of the Apartheid government (reflected in the slogan ‘No normal sport in an abnormal society’).81 The campaign against Rhodesia, both in 1968 and particularly before the 1972 Olympics, certainly foreshadowed this turn in strategy, and may potentially have contributed to its adaptation. Although the exclusion of Rhodesia from the 1968 Olympics represented a victory for the British government, the longer-term issue of solving the ‘Rhodesia problem’ was no nearer to a resolution. Indeed, the two main headlines of the Times newspaper on the 14th of October 1968 were the opening of the Mexico City Olympics and the collapse of yet another summit meeting between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith.82 It took ten more years before Britain and the Smith regime reached a settlement. Agreement finally came in 1978, paving the way for multi-racial elections the following year, with the newly-renamed nation of Zimbabwe attaining full, and internationally recognized, independence on 6 December 1979.
∗ Charles Little is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Business and Service SectorManagement at the London Metropolitan University, United Kingdom.
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